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INTRODUCTION
This article will address a new pattern of worker representation that
makes up one component of the emerging structure of low-wage, contin-
gent work. This pattern, which has not previously been noted, is one in
which low-wage service workers are represented by a tetralogy of inter-
acting institutions: unions, government, legal advocacy groups, and eth-
nic groups.
While some contributions to this Symposium employ a broader def-
inition of the new workforce, I will confine my remarks to low-wage
service jobs-the only kind of job to grow numerically in the United
States during the past decade or more.1 While such jobs are sometimes
referred to as "post-Taylorist," this seems a mistake to me. On the con-
trary, their growth has been fueled by the discovery that service jobs may
be as minutely subdivided and monitored as industrial jobs, thus permit-
ting employers to fill them with contingent workers who will shortly
move on to other jobs.
Consider, for example, the maid service for which Barbara
Ehrenreich worked briefly, in which maids are required to carry four
t Professor and Sidney Reitman Scholar, Rutgers. The State University of New Jersey
School of Law, Newark.
I See generally STEPHEN A. HERZENBERG, JOHN A. ALIC, & HOWARD WIAL, NEW
RULES FOR A NEW ECONOMY: EMPLOYMENT AND OPPORTUNITY IN POSTINDUSTRIAL AMERICA
(1998). 1 recently examined at length aspects of work by high-end workers who change jobs
frequently in ALAN HYDE, WORKING IN SILICON VALLEY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS OF
A HIGH-VELOCITY LABOR MARKET (2003).
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rags, one placed in each of four pockets of their uniforms. This is classic
Taylorist work organization. Ehrenreich shows that the methods of this
company did not ensure particularly clean houses and, in fact, were quite
ineffective at eliminating bacteria. However, this kind of minute work
definition permits a company to control its existing workforce by elimi-
nating any discretion in the worker and thus easily integrate a constant
stream of new workers.2
The call center is the epitome of the new Taylorist service job. Per-
haps 4.0 million workers in the United States alone, constituting 3.0 per-
cent of the labor force, work on telephones answering customer requests
and complaints and taking orders.3 These workers must employ pre-
scribed scripts, and a call center worker who assists a customer without
referring to the script is regarded as an organizational failure.4 Not sur-
prisingly, these jobs, too, can thus accommodate an ever-changing
workforce, and may also be easily shipped to India or elsewhere.
The growth of these short-term service jobs challenges our entire
system of labor and employment law in ways that scholars (this author
included) have only begun to explore. It is no exaggeration to say that
our entire system of labor and employment law is premised on the pic-
2 BARBARA EHRENREICH, NICKEL AND DIMED: ON (NOT) GETTING BY IN AMERICA 70-
119 (2001) ("When you enter a house, you spray a white rag with Windex and place it in the
left pocket of your green apron. Another rag, sprayed with disinfectant, goes into the middle
pocket, and a yellow rag bearing wood polish in the right-hand pocket. A dry rag, for buffing
surfaces, occupies the ight-hand pocket of your slacks.").
3 The government does not collect data specifically on employees in call centers. I
constructed a crude estimate by visiting the most recent news bulletin by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics on Occupational Employment and Wages for 2003 (released Apr. 30, 2004), availa-
ble at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/ocwage.pdf, and adding together data on the fol-
lowing categories of workers:
Telemarketers 404,150
Customer service representatives 1,902,850
Order clerks 303,320
Reservation and transportation clerks 165,990
Computer support specialists 482,990
Insurance claims clerks 234,580
Bill and account clerks 417,100
TOTAL: 3,910,980
Total US workforce: 127,567,910
Percent: 
-3.0%
This figure includes some people who do not work in call centers, but leaves out others listed
in other sectors (for example, health care) who do. By comparison, the same series listed a
total of only 10.5 million production workers in the entire U.S. manufacturing sector. http://
www.bls.gov/oes/#overview, "Latest Numbers" (May 2003 Survey).
4 SIMON HEAD, THE NEW RUTHLESS ECONOMY: WORK AND POWER IN THE DIGITAL AGE
87 (2003) ("Sharna F. Kahn, a senior project manager at KPMG Consultants defines a defi-
cient [Customer Relations Management] software product as one that is so slow that 'agents
[come] up with their own solutions for the customer.'") (quoting Sharna Kahn, Redefining
Call Center Metrics: The Quality Connection, CCS (Jan. 1999) at 2, available at http://www.
tmcnet.com/articles/ccsmag/0199/0199kpmg.htm.)
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ture of a worker who works every day at the same place and for the same
employer-a model increasingly at odds with reality. A stable work-
place constructed of such workers can be the foundation for a "bargain-
ing unit" in a labor law system that primarily defines the boundaries of
workers' rights to communicate with each other and to take group action.
However, labor law does not recognize worker communities consisting
of the people in a large geographic area or labor market who have been
employed in a particular type of work for a number of different employ-
ers over a long period of time, such as in temporary office help or land-
scaping. The law of retirement benefits offers some tax incentives for
employers to offer such benefits, but there are no incentives to offer them
in the forms that are most secure for working people. Instead, the law
focuses mainly on making promises of retirement benefits non-forfeita-
ble after five or ten years, so vesting schedules are becoming increas-
ingly irrelevant to a workforce in which the median worker has been with
his or her current employer for barely three years. 5 As a practical matter,
anti-discrimination laws unintentionally apply mainly to incumbent em-
ployees, particularly those late in their careers. They do not effectively
reach refusals to hire and thus have little relevance in industries struc-
tured to ensure that employees have few late-career employees. 6
When the editors of this Symposium first asked me to discuss col-
lective bargaining in the new economy, I responded that there wasn't
any. I was thinking of the fact that today's low-wage, contingent jobs
are usually not union jobs. Of course, most American jobs are not union
jobs.7 In the 1990s, there were some significant union organizing suc-
cesses in organizing low-wage service workers, including the Justice for
Janitors campaign of the Service Employees International Union,8 the
5 The median US worker has been with his or her current employer for 4 years (3.5
years for private sector employees). At the turn of the decade, the figure was as low as 3.4
years, having dropped steadily since the government began measuring it in 1983. Many work-
ers with low tenure have lost jobs or dropped out of the labor force altogether in the past few
years. The decline is of particular interest due to the size of the aging baby-boom generation.
An aging workforce would normally result in increased job tenures; instead, job tenures have
been dropping. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employee Tenure in 2004, available at http://
www.bls.gov/news.release/tenure.nr0.htm.
6 Id.
7 About 12.9 percent of the U.S. workforce is now represented by a union (down from
13.3 percent in 2002); about 8.2 percent of the private sector workforce is represented by a
union. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Members in 2003, USDL 04-53 (Jan. 21, 2004),
available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf.
8 Howard Wial, The Emerging Organizational Structure of Unionism in Low-Wage Ser-
vices, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 671, 693-98 (1993); Christopher L. Erickson et al., Justice for
Janitors in Los Angeles and Beyond: A New Form of Unionism in the 21st Century?, in THE
CHANGING ROLE OF UNIONS: NEW FORMS OF REPRESENTATION (Phanindra W. Wunnava ed.
2004); Jests Martfnez Saldafla, At the Periphery of Democracy: The Binational Politics of
Mexican Immigrants in Silicon Valley (1993) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
California, Berkeley).
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same union's extraordinary campaign among home health care attendants
in Los Angeles County which ended in the passage of new state legisla-
tion to create quasi-public bargaining authorities, 9 and the successful
campaign in the same county to organize dry-wall workers-the most
numerically successful of the decade's campaigns among immigrant
workers.10 The twenty-first century, however, has yet to bring successes
on this scale. No doubt this partly reflects aspects of labor law that im-
pede union organizing, both generally and among low-income service
workers in particular." Unions have also explored new organizational
forms, such as operating their own temporary help agency in Silicon Val-
ley' 2 and supporting workers centers offering many services to immi-
grant workers.
This Article will cast a different light on this question by examining
three recent cases of union advocacy among low-wage service workers in
the New York City area: employees, almost entirely of Mexican origin,
of Korean-owned greengrocers; deliverymen, mostly West African, for
supermarkets and drug chains; and domestic workers of all races and
nationalities. In all three cases, advocacy for these workers from tradi-
tional labor unions competed (or cooperated) with three alternative repre-
sentational institutions: legal advocacy groups such as the National
Employment Law Project (NELP) or law school clinics, ethnic or immi-
grant advocacy groups, and public entities such as the New York State
Attorney General or New York City Council. While all three incidents
were victories of sorts for the workers involved, none was a victory for
traditional union representation. In all three, unions were either outma-
neuvered or otherwise made to appear as unattractive alternatives, and
9 See Karl Klare, The Horizons of Transformative Labour and Employment Law, in
LABOUR LAW IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION: TRANSFORMATIVE PRACTICES AND POSSIBILITIES
20-23 (Joanne Conaghan et al., eds., 2002) (describing the campaign).
10 Michael Flagg, Unions Get a Wake-Up Call as Drywallers Achieve an Unlikely Vic-
tory, LOS ANGELES TIMES, Nov. 8, 1992, at D3; Ruth Milkman & Kent Wong, Organizing the
Wicked City: The 1992 Southern California Drywall Strike, in ORGANIZING IMMIGRANTS: THE
CHALLENGE FOR UNIONS IN CONTEMPORARY CALIFORNIA 169-98 (Ruth Milkman ed. 2000).
11 Wial, supra note 8, at 706-38 (NLRB preference for small single-employer units over
larger geographic units; restrictions on union ability to create geographic or multiemployer
bargaining; weak protection for area standards picketing; restrictions on secondary pressure;
limited use of joint employer liability; ease with which employers may withdraw from mul-
tiemployer units; absence of provisions for extension of collective bargaining agreements;
weak privileges for worker associations that represent less than a majority); Katherine V.W.
Stone, The New Psychological Contract: Implications of the Changing Workplace for Labor
and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 519, 621-31 (2001) (bargaining units that exclude
temporary workers, arbitration, secondary boycott restrictions, definition of employee, limited
successor liability).
12 Chris Benner & Amy Dean, Labor in the New Economy: Lessons from Labor Or-
ganizing in Silicon Valley, in NONSTANDARD WORK: THE NATURE AND CHALLENGE OF
CHANGING EMPLOYMENT ARRANGEMENTS 361, 370-73 (Franqoise Carr6 et al., eds., 2000)
(describing Temporary Worker Employment Project); Hyde, supra note 1, at 175-
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none of the resolutions reached did anything to strengthen future organi-
zational representation, union or otherwise, of the workers involved.
The three examples described here may not represent a widespread
trend, but that is not the aim of this article. The examples are offered in
the interest of drawing attention to this emerging tetralogy of representa-
tion, combining unions, legal advocacy, ethnic or immigrant groups, and
public officials.1 3 The pattern bristles with potential legal issues, some
of which I will point out and many of which will be left to the reader and
to future cases to develop.
I. MEXICAN WORKERS AT KOREAN GREENGROCERS 14
Greengrocers in New York City, estimated to include some two
thousand stores, are almost entirely owned by immigrants from Korea.
Many in the generation that emigrated from Korea following reform of
U.S. immigration laws in 1965 gravitated to small business ownership.
In New York City, Korean immigrants began opening small greengro-
ceries in the mid-1970s.' 5 Some 78% of these grocers had college de-
grees and had worked as engineers, schoolteachers, administrators, and
in other occupations in Korea, while only 6% had owned small busi-
nesses there.' 6 In their early years, these businesses typically were fam-
ily-run and employed few others. As family members developed other
interests, they began to hire outside helpers, the vast majority of whom
were immigrants from Mexico.
Korean grocers enjoyed a competitive advantage over similar busi-
nesses due in part in the long hours kept by the stores and worked by the
owners. Reports soon surfaced of similar hours being demanded of em-
ployees-conduct that violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). 17
When the State Attorney General settled the first such violation, workers
at two groceries were found to have worked an average 72 hours per
week without overtime pay. Their weekly salaries of $180-360 worked
13 The classical tetralogy, submitted for the prize in drama in Athens in the 5th pre-
Christian century, consisted of three tragedies and a satyr play. J.A. CUDDON, THE PENGUIN
DICTIONARY OF LITERARY TERMS AND LITERARY THEORY 962 (3d Ed. 1991). I do not mean to
imply, however, that one of the institutions representing low-wage service workers will turn
out to be a farce.
14 This section draws on research by Jung Kim, J.D., Rutgers 2003. See also Matthew T.
Bodie, The Potential for State Labor Law: The New York Greengrocer Code of Conduct, 21
HOFSTRA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 183 (2003).
15 See generally ILLSOo KIM, NEW URBAN IMMIGRANTS: THE KOREAN COMMUNITY IN
NEW YORK 112-21 (1981); Illsoo Kim, The Koreans: Small Business in an Urban Frontier, in
NEW IMMIGRANTS IN NEW YORK 219-42 (Nancy Foner ed. 1987).
16 Ronald Takaki, The Myth of the Successful Koreatown Grocer: Spike Lee's Camera
Misses an Important Angle, Los ANGELES TIMES (Aug. 20, 1989), available at http://modelmi-
nority.com/printout288.html.
17 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. The FLSA requires, one and a half times regular pay for hours
beyond forty per week. 20 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (2004).
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out to an hourly wage between $2.80 and $3.60 per hour at a time when
the relevant statutory minimum was $5.15 per hour.18
In May of 1998, two years prior to this settlement, Local 169,
UNITE, began an organizing campaign among greengrocer workers. 19
While this local had not traditionally represented workers in retail gro-
ceries, its leadership included many Latinos. 20 The campaign included
boisterous sidewalk demonstrations (with mariachi bands) outside some
prominently-positioned Manhattan groceries, creating some public pres-
sure for resolution.21 Matters escalated as at least one grocery signed a
union contract with a different union, creating rivalries among the gro-
ceries and increasing crowd levels.22
A resolution of sorts came almost four years after the start of the
union drive in the form of a peculiar agreement brokered by the Office of
the New York State Attorney General who (as we shall see further) had
taken an active role in representing low-wage workers. 23 Local 169 had
reported violations of labor standards to that office, which had won back
pay for some employees. 24 As part of this agreement, the Greengrocer
Code of Conduct was announced on September 17, 2002.25
The Code affects only greengrocers who voluntarily agree to abide
by its provisions. 26 Those who do pledge to comply with federal and
18 Press release, Office of New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, Greengrocers
Settle Labor Abuse Charges (Aug. 30, 2000), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/
2000/aug/aug3Oa 00.html.
19 UNITE stands for Union of Needletrades, Industrial and Textile Employees.
20 Indeed, Local 169's claim of jurisdiction was controversial. Around the time of the
adoption of the Greengrocer Code of Conduct in September of 2002, Local 169 had relin-
quished jurisdiction over greengrocers to Local 1500, United Food and Commercial Workers
(UFCW). Telephone interview with Mike Donovan, Research and Education Director, Local
169, (February 20, 2004).
21 Andrew Jacobs, Not a Horn of Plenty, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 1998), at 14-4.
22 Tom Robbins, The Sweetheart Union, VILLAGE VOICE (March 27, 2001). The union
was Local 1964 of the International Longshoremen's Association, a catchall local based in
Ridgefield Park, NJ.
23 See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, Waging War, from Wall Street to Corner Grocery: Be-
yond the High-Profile Cases, Spitzer Helps Low-Wage Workers, N.Y. TIMES (January 21,
2004) at B I.
24 See text supra accompanying note 21; see also Press Release, Office of New York
State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, Spitzer and Consul General Announce Settlement of
Labor Abuse Cases Against Greengroceries (November 20, 2001) available at http://www.
oag.state.ny.us/press/2001/novnov2Oa_0O.html. The initial decision to invoke the State Attor-
ney General was adventitious. The statute of limitations under the New York state labor stan-
dards law is three years longer than the corresponding federal statute. Seminar presentation,
Kevin Finnegan, Esq., Assistant Director, Service Employees International Union State Coun-
cil (formerly with Local 169, UNITE), February 23, 2004.
25 GREENGROCER CODE OF CONDUCT, available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/workplace/
workplace.html.
26 As of March 2004, some 200 greengrocers had voluntarily agreed. Seminar presenta-
tion, Jennifer Brand, Office of New York State Attorney General, March 30, 2004. There is
no mechanism for imposing the Code on all members of the trade association, as would be true
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state minimum wage and overtime standards and state and federal labor
law. 27 The only new legal requirements imposed on employers by the
Code is an agreement to provide employees with sick and vacation
days, 28 attend educational training sessions on labor law, allow employ-
ees to attend similar sessions, and submit to monitoring of payroll
records. The Code also creates a Code of Conduct Committee, com-
prised of employer and employee representatives and a representative
selected by the Attorney General. The Attorney General is given further
authority to monitor workplaces and payroll visits. However, grocers
who sign an additional Assurance of Discontinuance are assured that the
Attorney General's office "agrees to exercise its discretion to refrain
from investigating civil violations of the minimum wage and overtime
laws.. .which occurred prior to the signing of the Assurance.' '29
In addition to the Attorney General, the Code was negotiated by the
Korean American Association of Greater New York and Korean Ameri-
can Produce Association (representing employers), by representatives
from the state AFL-CIO (but not either Local 169 or Local 1500), and by
Casa Mexico (representing employees). 30 Its two most striking features
are its weakness and its anomalous legal status, which are likely related.
The unions appear, to have obtained nothing from the agreement. In fact,
the Code appears to have halted, rather than assisted, union organizing;
no new greengrocers have recognized Local 1500 since the Code was
signed.31 The employers agreed only to comply with laws that bound
them anyway and to grant two sick days and a week of vacation. In
exchange, they received effective immunity from prosecution for past
violations. These prosecutions had previously resulted in settlements of
over $600,000 against just six greengrocers.
of normal multi-employer bargaining. See generally Douglas L. Leslie, Multiemployer Bar-
gaining Rules, 75 VA. L. REV. 241 (1989).
27 Greengrocer Code of Conduct, supra note 25, at Art. I.
28 Id. at 1.15 (at least two paid sick days to each employee who has worked for one year,
and three to each employee after two years), 1. 16 (one workweek of paid vacation days to each
employee who has worked for one year).
29 Id. at IV.
30 Steven Greenhouse, Korean Grocers Agree to Double Pay and Improve Workplace
Conditions, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2002, at B 1; Press Release, Office of New York State Attor-
ney General Eliot Spitzer, Landmark Code of Conduct to Improve Working Conditions in the
Greengrocer Industry (September 17, 2002), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/
2002/sep/sep 1 7a_02.html.
31 Seminar presentation, Jennifer Brand, Office of New York State Attorney General,
March 30, 2004. It is still not difficult to find Mexican immigrants who normally work in
greengroceries an illegal 72-hour week for which they are paid $200. The $450 weekly wage
for groceries complying with the Code of Conduct is pegged to the legal minimum wage and
has not been increased since the effective date of the Code. Andrew Kennis, Not All Green-
grocer Workers Reap Fruits of Victory, THE VILLAGER, April 7-13, 2004, at 12; Steven Green-
house & Seth Kugel, Labor Truce Wearing Thin for Koreans and Mexicans, N.Y. TIMES,
September 27, 2004, at B3.
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What is the legal status of this agreement? It is not a collective
bargaining agreement. Employees selected neither the union representa-
tives from the state AFL-CIO nor Casa Mexico to represent them. While
employers may voluntarily recognize a union as the exclusive representa-
tive of its workforce, they violate the National Labor Relations Act if
that union does not in fact represent a majority of employees in the bar-
gaining unit. None of the AFL-CIO, Casa Mexico, or the locals could
make such a showing here. 32 At the time the Code was promulgated,
Local 169 reportedly represented workers at only seven groceries and, as
mentioned, was in the process of withdrawing from that industry. 33 It is
true that the grocers might lawfully have recognized the unions merely as
representatives of their own members. However, the agreement applies
to all employees, not just union members. 34 Under federal labor law,
collective agreements are negotiated by a union with representatives that
may be replaced at government-run elections, that must elect officers and
otherwise observe internal democracy, 35 and that owes all those it repre-
sents a duty of fair representation. 36 The state AFL-CIO that signed the
Code was not elected by greengrocer workers, cannot be replaced by
them, faces no democratic control from any rank-and-file workers, and
probably owes those workers no duty of fair representation. 37 It is not
surprising, then, that they signed such an ineffective agreement in which
the workers were effectively represented, albeit barely, by governmental
officials and not unions. 38
32 Nat'l Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2); Int'l Ladies' Garment
Workers' Union v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731 (1961) (finding that § 8(a)(2) contains no scienter
requirement and is violated when an employer recognizes a union that the employer believes,
in good faith but mistakenly, represents a majority of the workforce).
33 Greenhouse, supra note 30.
34 Alan Hyde et al., After Smyrna: Rights and Powers of Unions that Represent Less
Than a Majority, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 637 (1993). It remains unclear whether such agree-
ments between an employer and a union, as representative only of its members, are governed
by state or federal law. Id. at 649 n.38. However, the Code of Conduct does not appear to be
such a "members only" agreement.
35 Labor-Mgmt. Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. § 401 et seq.
36 Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944) (creating duty); Air Line
Pilots Ass'n. v. O'Neill, 499 U.S. 65 (1991) (standard for fair representation suits against
union as contract negotiator).
37 Hyde et al., supra note 34, at 651 n.42.
38 Other entities that purported to speak for the grocery workers have an even more
shadowy existence. I have not yet been able to interview anyone at Casa Mexico. A Google
search reveals descriptions of it as an advocacy organization for Mexican immigrants but no
additional examples of its representation of workers other than the Greengrocer campaign.
One should also mention that the November 2001 settlement, cited supra at note 24, was also
announced jointly with the Consul-General of Mexico. Such direct relations between foreign
governments and American state or local government may be becoming more common and
have suggested to some deeper changes in the effective Constitution as it concerns foreign
affairs. See, e.g., Peter J. Spiro, Globalization and the (Foreign Affairs) Constitution, 63 OHIo
ST. L.J. 649, 692 n. 166 (2002).
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II. THE DELIVERY WORKERS SETTLEMENT
Delivery personnel for some New York City supermarkets and
drugstores have recently settled claims of labor standards violations, in
which they were effectively represented solely by advocacy groups and
the state Attorney General, and in which labor unions played a distinctly
negative role.
In New York City, where people do not drive to the supermarket or
the discount drugstore, delivery personnel or "walkers" deliver large or-
ders to customers' apartments or doormen. Until recently, most walkers,
who tend to be immigrants from West Africa, were treated as if they
were self-employed independent contractors, outside of labor or employ-
ment law. 39 Almost all walkers were referred by either City Express
Delivery or Hudson Delivery Services or their alter egos. However, both
of those companies, and of course the supermarkets themselves, denied
being the legal employers of the walkers. 40 As the Southern District of
New York found in a lawsuit involving walkers referred by Hudson to
the large Duane Reade discount drug chain, the walkers, "despite work-
ing eight to eleven hours a day, six days a week, were paid a flat rate of
between $20-$30 per day, well below minimum wage requirements. 41
A group of disgruntled walkers, some of whom had been bank tell-
ers or other educated workers in their homelands (for most of them,
Mali), held some demonstrations outside stores in October 1999. They
had sought union support, but been rebuffed. The demonstrations were
not effective. Independently, another walker (from Senegal) had con-
tacted the National Employment Law Project (NELP), a legal advocacy
group. NELP does not usually engage in class action litigation, prefer-
ring to work with organizations; however, after concluding that the walk-
ers were nowhere near organizing, they decided that they had to do
something and enlisted the assistance of the New York State Attorney
General. 42 Lawyers from NELP, joined by the State Attorney General,
sued the delivery companies and retailers in January 2000.
The suit involved difficult legal questions about the employment
status of the walkers and ended in victory for them on all the legal issues.
The district court, applying the multi-factor "economic realities" test ap-
propriate to the FLSA, held that the walkers were employees, not inde-
pendent contractors. 43 The court further held that the owners of the
39 Ansoumana v. Gristede's Operating Corp., 255 F. Supp. 2d 184, 187 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Seminar presentation, Catherine Ruckelshaus, National Employment Law Project
(March 9, 2004).
43 Ansoumana, 255 F. Supp. 2d at 188-92. The court found that: (1) the agencies con-
trolled the workers; (2) the workers had no opportunities for investment, profit, or loss; (3) no
independent initiative was required; (4) the permanence of the relationship was disputed; and
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agencies were individually liable for FLSA violations 44 and that the
Duane Reade drug store chain was a "joint employer" of the delivery
personnel and so jointly liable for any FLSA violations. 45 Some eleven
months after this decision, the drug stores and the remaining supermarket
defendants settled plaintiffs' claims for $3.2 million.46
While this was certainly effective representation of low-wage ser-
vice workers by legal advocacy and governmental organizations, they
were not able to institutionalize future representation for the delivery
workers. Astonishingly, by then, they had a union. As the court found in
March 2000, the delivery services had signed a collective bargaining
agreement with Local 338, Retail, Wholesale and Department Store
Workers Union (RWDSU/UFCW)-the union that had long served as
the representative of supermarket workers in the city (and that had not
conducted an organizing campaign in over thirty years).47 The agree-
ment provided that the delivery workers would be paid minimum wage
($5.15 an hour), time and a half for overtime (the legal minimum), and
credited $1.65 an hour in presumed tips against the employer's wage
obligation.48 The court's holding and the settlement brokered by NELP
and the Attorney General covered only the period before March 2000,
since after that date, the walkers had (and still have) a union, albeit one
that seemed to provide little advantage over being unrepresented. Local
338 did not participate in the litigation and its sole function seems to
have been to provide a date for terminating the employers'
responsibility. 49
Accounts like this might suggest that advocacy by government and
legal advocacy groups might be superior to union representation. De-
spite the negative role played by the union in the delivery personnel case,
I do not believe this conclusion is warranted. On the contrary, advocacy,
no matter how effective, that is limited to advocacy groups and public
officials has difficulty institutionalizing itself beyond a single advocacy
(5) the services performed by the workers were not merely integral to, but constitutive of, the
business of the delivery services.
44 Id. at 192-93. The individuals in question were founders, owners, and sole sharehold-
ers. Individual liability in general is much easier to establish under the FLSA, with its expan-
sive definition of "employer," than under other federal employment or labor statutes. See
United States Department of Labor v. Cole Enters., Inc., 62 F.3d 775, 778 (6th Cir. 1995).
45 Ansoumana, 255 F. Supp. 2d at 193-96. See Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331
U.S. 722 (1947) (slaughterhouse and subcontractor are joint employers of meat boners hired
by contractor); Torrez-Lopez v. May, 111 F.3d 633, 642-44 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding farm
owner and labor contractor joint employer of harvest workers referred by contractor).
46 Steven Greenhouse, Gristede's Deliverymen to Share in $3.2 Million Wage Settle-
ment, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2003, at B2.
47 Seminar presentation, Catherine Ruckelshaus, supra note 42.
48 Ansoumana, 255 F. Supp. 2d at 187-88.
49 Local 338 did appear to oppose NELP's application for attorneys' fees. Seminar pres-
entation, Catherine Ruckelshaus, supra note 42.
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campaign. Our third case illustrates this point. Legal and government
advocates in New York City have recently achieved passage of local leg-
islation for domestic workers that effects little change, though it may turn
out to be a rehearsal for more effective state legislation.
III. NEW YORK CITY LOCAL LAW 33 (2003): DOMESTIC
WORKERS LEGISLATION
Workers in private homes-taking care of children, cleaning, and
doing other household labor-have long fallen outside the scope of labor
and employment laws. 50 They are expressly excluded from the National
Labor Relations Act 51 and, if they live in the home, the maximum hours
requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act.52 In 1950, domestic and
household workers were added to the Social Security System, so pay-
ments into the fund are supposed to be made for them regardless of
whether they are considered employees or self-employed. 53 For domes-
tic workers who are employees, as opposed to self-employed, employers
are also supposed to deduct income taxes from employee wages. How-
ever, household surveys reveal about 1.13 million employees in private
homes, while only about three hundred thousand households report
household wages to the taxing authorities.5 4 Clearly, even with respect
to household workers legally able to work, income is not reported, and
payments to Social Security are not being made. Again, the reporting
obligation pertains both to independent contractors and employees. 55 At
50 See generally Peggie R. Smith, Regulating Paid Household Work: Class, Gender,
Race, and Agendas of Reform, 48 Am. U.L. REV. 851 (1999) (reviewing attitudes of feminist
and other social reformers towards domestic workers and illustrating their unreliable commit-
ment to reform) [hereinafter "Smith, Regulating"]; Peggie R. Smith, Organizing the Unor-
ganizable: Private Paid Household Workers and Approaches to Employee Representation, 79
N.C. L. REV. 45 (2000) (reviewing historical efforts at organizing these workers and improv-
ing their working conditions) [hereafter "Smith, Organizing"].
51 National Labor Relations Act §2(3), 29 U.S.C. §152(3) (2004) (excluding from the
definition of "employee" "any individual .. in the domestic service of any family or person at
his home").
52 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(21) (1938) (excluding from the
statutory requirement of time and a half for hours over forty "any employee who is employed
in domestic service in a household and who resides in such household"). Until 1974, domestic
workers were entirely excluded from the FLSA, but amendments in that year brought them
under the minimum wage provisions, and, for those who did not live in the home in which they
worked, the maximum hours provision. Fair Labor Standards Act Amendments of 1974, Pub.
L. No. 93-259, 88 Stat. 55, 62 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(f) (minimum wage) & 207(1)
(maximum hours)).
53 EDWARD D. BERKOWITZ, AMERICA'S WELFARE STATE 58-60 (1991) (describing the
process of incorporating domestic workers into Social Security).
54 Smith, Regulating, supra note 50, at 921 n.428; David Cay Johnston, Despite an Eas-
ing of Rules, Millions Evade 'Nanny Tax', N.Y. TIMES, April 5, 1998, at 1.
55 Smith, Regulating, supra note 50, at 921 n.428 (quoting Internal Revenue Service
analysis). Before 1994, half a million households reported payments to household labor. Id.
In that year, Congress simplified the reporting and payment requirements and added a line to
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worst, some domestic workers are essentially kept in slavery, unable ever
to leave the house and given no days off. 56
The leading player in current advocacy efforts is Domestic Workers
United-a group funded with money from George Soros that began as a
project of Asian advocacy organizations. 57 Organizers decided to at-
tempt to achieve a legislative victory after having organized protest dem-
onstrations against particular employers-interestingly, the same first act
taken by the Mexican greengrocer and West African delivery employees.
They enlisted the help of the Immigrants' Rights Clinic at New York
University to draft legislation.58 The New York City Council, over-
whelmingly Democratic and liberal, was much more politically favorable
terrain than state government, where Republicans controlled the state
Senate and the Governorship. However, the legislative authority of the
City Council, as of any municipal government, was limited by the local
government law of the state. NYU students discovered that the City nev-
ertheless did have jurisdiction to regulate employment agencies and had
previously done so under its authority over consumer protection.59 The
result became Local Law 33 (2003), adopted by the City Council in May
2003 and signed by the Mayor in June 2003.60
The law requires the City to prepare a statement of the rights of
domestic workers and requires employment agencies to give one to each
applicant for household employment and to the employer.61 Agencies
the standard report of income filed by individual taxpayers asking for the amount of taxes
owed on wages paid to household help. Johnston, supra note 54. It was anticipated that this
would lead to more reports of such wages. However, the changes had precisely the opposite
effect, and now only around three hundred thousand households report paying such wages. Id.
56 See, e.g., Manliguez v. Joseph, 226 F. Supp. 2d 377 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (denying motion
to dismiss suit under Alien Tort Claims Act); Jennifer Sinco Kelleher, Domestic Workers Take
a Stand: Rally in Support of 4-year-old Dispute, NEWSDAY, Aug. 10, 2003, at A39.
57 This paragraph is drawn largely from interviews with Councilmember Gale Brewer
and Professor Michael Wishnie. Seminar presentation, Gale Brewer, New York City
Councilmember (Feb. 17, 2004); Interview with Michael Wishnie, Professor, New York Uni-
versity School of Law (February 19, 2004).
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 The full text of the law is available at http://www.council.nyc.ny.us/pdf-files/bills/
law03033.pdf.
61 § 20-771 STATEMENT OF EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND EMPLOYER OBLIGATIONS UNDER
STATE AND FEDERAL LAW. a. Every licensed employment agency under the jurisdic-
tion of the commissioner and engaged in the job placement of domestic or household
employees shall provide to each applicant for employment as a domestic or house-
hold employee and his or her prospective employer, before job placement is ar-
ranged, a written statement indicating the rights of such employee and the
obligations of his or her employer under state and federal law. Such statement of
rights and obligations shall embody provisions of state and federal laws that pertain
to domestic or household employees, both in their capacity as workers in New York
State and the United States and in their capacity specifically as domestic or house-
hold employees in New York state and the United States. Such statement of rights
and obligations shall include, but not be limited to, a general description of em-
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must also give domestic workers a full job description and keep records.
Violations of the statute may result in fines.
62
The statute is unlikely to accomplish much on its own terms.63 The
limitation on agencies is an artifact of the City Council's jurisdiction and
severely circumscribes its effectiveness. No one seems to have any good
idea of the percentage of household workers in the City referred by agen-
cies, but it is undisputedly a minority.64 Agencies were not accused of
involvement in the horror cases amounting to slavery. In any case, the
City Council did not think it had authority to mandate particular working
conditions, so did not attempt to do so. At the time of the writing of this
Article, it remains unclear whether the official statements of rights are in
fact available at employment agencies. 6
5
Domestic Workers United did not regard the City legislation as a
final accomplishment, but rather a first effort at the legislative process.
Its next priority is state legislation, still in the planning stage. States
retain the power to legislate particular terms of employment exceeding
the federal minima.66 Since domestic workers are excluded from the Na-
ployee rights and employer obligations pursuant to laws regarding minimum wage,
overtime and hours of work, record keeping, social security payments, unemploy-
ment insurance coverage, disability insurance coverage and workers' compensation.
Such statement of rights and obligations shall be prepared and distributed by the
commissioner to licensed employment agencies over which the commissioner has
jurisdiction.
Local Law 33 of 2003, § 20-771 (2003).
62 §20-772 STATEMENT OF JOB CONDITIONS; RECORDS. a. Every licensed employ-
ment agency under the jurisdiction of the commissioner and engaged in the job
placement of domestic or household employees shall provide to each applicant for
employment as a domestic or household employee a written statement, in a form
approved by the commissioner, of the job conditions of each potential employment
position to which the agency recommends that the applicant apply. Each such state-
ment shall fully and accurately describe the nature and terms of employment, includ-
ing the name and address of the person to whom the applicant is to apply for such
employment, the name and address of the person authorizing the hiring for such
position, wages, hours of work, the kind of services to be performed and agency fee.
Id. at § 20-772.
63 The principal function of having employers acknowledge in writing that they have
read the statement of rights of domestic workers is to negate the defenses, commonly raised in
litigation under the FLSA, of good faith (affecting liquidated damages) or that underpayment
was not willful (which affects the statute of limitations). E-mail communication, Professor
Michael Wishnie, March 1, 2004.
64 The estimate of 40% by Domestic Workers United seems very high. See Daniela
Gerson, Union Is Seeking to Organize Child-Care Givers, NEW YORK SUN, Oct. 31, 2003, at 1.
65 Seminar presentation, Councilmember Gale Brewer, Feb. 17, 2004 (reporting com-
plaints to her office, awaiting verification, that the statements of rights were not in fact availa-
ble at employment agencies).
66 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 § 18(a), 29 U.S.C. §218(a) (1938) ("No provision of
this chapter or of any order thereunder shall excuse noncompliance with any Federal or State
law or municipal ordinance establishing a minimum wage higher than the minimum wage
established under this chapter or a maximum workweek lower than the maximum workweek
established under this chapter ... ").
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tional Labor Relations Act, states are also presumably free to legislate
protection against retaliation for their organizational activity and, though
this is harder to imagine, procedures for collective bargaining. 67 Domes-
tic Workers United maintains a recommended employment contract for
domestic employment on its web page.68 One possibility under discus-
sion is to try to make this contract mandatory through state legislation.
For present purposes, its most interesting feature is one of omission: it
says nothing about organizational activity or affiliation by domestic
workers. It does not seek to provide organizational rights for Domestic
Workers United or any other advocacy organization, or for any union
that might become interested in organizing domestic workers at some
future time-an organizing campaign that would be governed entirely by
state law. 69
I would suggest that, as with the greengrocer workers, the weakness
so far in substantive protection for domestic workers mutually reinforces
the weakness in the organizational rights of their self-designated advo-
cates. I say this precisely because of my high regard for the intelligence,
honesty, and ability of these advocacy organizations. The historical ex-
perience of advocacy groups like Domestic Workers United is that it is
difficult for them to sustain themselves. 70 This is not merely a problem
for their self-interest but puts limits on their potential to achieve gains for
those whom they claim to represent. They will be forced to accept
crumbs from the legislative process as their only source of legitimacy.
67 The exclusion of agricultural workers from the NLRA permits states to regulate their
collective labor activity. See United Farm Workers v. Arizona Agricultural Employment Rela-
tions Board, 669 F. 2d 1249, 1257 (9th Cir. 1982); Willmar Poultry Co., Inc. v. Jones, 430 F.
Supp. 573 (D. Minn. 1977). The same is true of teachers in parochial schools. Christ the King
Regional High School v. Culvert, 815 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that the state labor
board may assert jurisdiction over parochial schools excluded from NLRA). States, by con-
trast, are not permitted to regulate the collective labor activity of groups as to which Congress
or one of its designated agencies has affirmatively desired an unregulated labor market, such
as supervisors. Compare Hanna Mining Co. v. District 2, Marine Engineers Beneficial Ass'n,
382 U.S. 181 (1965) (states may enjoin organizational picketing by supervisors' organization)
with Beasley v. Food Fair of North Carolina, Inc., 416 U.S. 653 (1974) (states may not inter-
fere with employer's federal privilege to discharge supervisors for union membership). The
principle that explains all these results is elusive, to put it mildly. My opinion, based on the
review of the exclusion of domestic employees in Smith, Organizing, supra note 50, at 62-64,
is that they are more like agricultural workers and parochial school teachers. That is, they are
excluded from the Act due to political considerations and doubts (in 1935 or later) about
Congress's commerce power, not because Congress determined that their employers must be
privileged to fire them if they join an advocacy organization.
68 Available at http://www.caaav.orgldownloads/Standard Contract.pdf.
69 Traditional unions were not involved in the legislative process in the New York City
Council. The Service Employees International Union is attempting to maintain cordial rela-
tions with the movement of domestic workers, recently hosting a dinner for domestic workers.
Seminar presentation, Councilmember Gale Brewer, supra note 57.
70 See both articles by Peggie Smith, supra note 50, reviewing the long history but short
lives of organizations representing domestic workers.
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While these remarks are not the occasion to develop projects for the
collective representation of home workers, some models are available.
As noted above, collective bargaining already exists for some home
workers and attendants paid with public money through programs like
Medicare. 71 Employers could be encouraged, by signing a standard
agreement, to commit to periodic renegotiation of the agreement by rep-
resentatives elected by employer groups and the domestic workers. At
the very least, however, the growth of representation of domestic work-
ers requires legal protection against retaliation for their joining groups
like Domestic Workers United.
CONCLUSION
Most low-wage service jobs in the U.S. continue to be nonunion and
involve nothing that can be described as collective bargaining. Among
the small minority of such workers that have sought representation, many
of the emerging bargaining processes differ substantially from traditional
collective bargaining. At least four kinds of groups compete to represent
low-wage service workers: unions, government, legal advocacy organi-
zations, and ethnic advocates. Bargaining processes are complex, and
the results for workers are so far tentative. Unions so far have played
either a negative role (Local 338 RWDSU for drug store delivery person-
nel), have been passive (Local 1500's unwillingness to organize green-
grocers despite winning jurisdiction; Local 169 UNITE's withdrawal), or
have been cut out (or cut themselves out) of deals that are modestly
favorable to workers but accord no rights to their organizations (such as
the Greengrocer Code of Conduct, the existing New York City law, and
the proposed state legislation on domestic workers).
While unions have been passive and ineffective in the recent New
York campaigns, resolution has largely been driven by the alliance be-
tween legal or ethnic advocacy groups and governmental entities like the
State Attorney General or City Council. The advocacy groups are self-
designated. Nobody elected them and they are not responsible to any-
one. They have no legal basis to compel their own recognition. Conse-
quently, their legitimacy depends on their ability to extract benefits from
government, and they often must accept relatively small amounts. The
governmental entities, in turn, seem largely motivated by some public
officials' desire for a favorable image as friends of poor workers. They
have no institutional capacity or interest in creating or sustaining systems
of representation that will survive the particular advocacy campaign in
which they are involved. Indeed, for workers covered by the National
Labor Relations Act-that is, delivery workers and grocery workers (but
71 Kare, supra note 9.
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not domestic workers)-state and local governments are constitutionally
preempted from creating or encouraging employee organization. 72 Thus,
the governments depend on the advocacy organizations to represent
workers, as those organizations depend on government to provide bene-
fits that give them legitimacy. 73 I am sorry to be so negative about the
emerging tetralogy of representation, particularly since most low-wage
workers in the U.S. have no one to speak for them at all. No doubt the
dominance of advocacy and governmental organizations reflects the pas-
sivity of the unions in New York. From the unions' perspective, small
shops like greengrocers, to say nothing of domestic workers, are expen-
sive to organize and service. While this is true, it ignores the fact that
just these workers, like the delivery workers whom the union has treated
so poorly, are prominent in the public eye. Many New Yorkers of all
classes, certainly children, see few other low-wage service workers as
often as the household domestic, the assistant in the comer greengrocery,
and the delivery man from the supermarket who comes to the apartment.
They will form their opinion of unions by how they treat the most visible
low-wage workers.
Writing in his diary in 1941, Bertolt Brecht was both fascinated and
repelled by the lack of permanence of American theatrical production, in
which he and other emigr6s from fascism were then employed. Groups
of theater professionals would gather to mount a production, disperse,
and gather again. This fluidity, so unlike the German system of state
theaters, made it easy for him and his colleagues to become part of the
industry. Yet, he wrote, "it is nomadic theatre, by people on the move
for people who are lost."'74
Today, the entire economy has become like the theater of Brecht's
time (and ours). Certainly, its fluidity continues to permit it to integrate
today's immigrants-not just German playwrights or Indian software en-
gineers, but, as we have seen, Mexican grocery workers, West African
delivery personnel, and nannies and housekeepers from all over the
world. However, in thinking about how to prevent exploitation in this
labor market, we may have to reverse Brecht's aphorism. Labor and
employment law is now, increasingly, for people on the move. We who
make it must be sure that we are not lost.
72 There do not appear to have been any recent attempts by states or local governments to
create bargaining structures for workers covered by the NLRA. The conclusion that they
would be preempted from doing so is a simple one from the basic principles of preemption set
out in San Diego Building Trades Council v. Gannon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
73 A representative of the Attorney General who spoke to my seminar referred to the
alliance with advocacy organizations as their preferred "model" of litigation. Jennifer Brand,
supra note 26.
74 BERTOLT BRECHT, JOURNALS 166 (Hugh Rorrison trans., John Willett ed. 1993) (Octo-
ber 22, 1941).
